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POSSIBLE IMPACTS OF UNITED STATES DOMESTIC 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES ON LESS DEVELOPED 
COUNTRIES' TRADE, INVESTMENTS, AND 
FOREIGN AID 
By James A. Gibson* 
The United States has undertaken environmental control and 
pollution abatement programs to achieve domestic objectives, but 
such policies can have both favorable and adverse impacts on the 
economic development of less developed countries (LDCs). Some 
possible major negative impacts include an increase in tariff bar-
riers on LDCs' exports, diminished demand for LDCs' raw materi-
als, an increase in the prices of LDCs' imports, a decrease in foreign 
aid to LDCs, and a tendency to transfer inappropriate technology 
to LDCs. In some fields, U.S. domestic environmental policies may 
open up new favorable possibilities for LDCs through U.S. "pollu-
tion exportation" and a growing demand for natural products at the 
expense of synthetic products. To enable LDCs to take full advan-
tage of the fresh opportunities that may arise, and at the same time 
minimize any extra burdens that domestic U.S. environmental poli-
cies may impose on LDCs, this paper concludes that the U.S. will 
have to move beyond a vague rhetoric of concern and incorporate 
the adverse impact of domestic environmental programs on foreign 
economies into the developmental assistance programs for LDCs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the United States, the environment has been rediscovered. 
Mother Earth has a week dedicated to her on the calendar. School 
children crusade to clean up the streets, college students organize 
huge demonstrations, and industries that dump their wastes on the 
environment are denounced as public enemies. Yet among the grow-
ing section of the U.S. public that is aware and concerned with 
environmental problems, international environmental problems, 
until very recently, have been only of marginal interest. 
109 
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A. International Environmental Problems 
International environmental problems can be categorized into 
physical-linkage effects and social-linkage effects. I Physical-linkage 
effects are those problems that physically involve nearly all nations 
of the world either as emitters or receptors of pollution. Two familiar 
examples are the use of persistent pesticides and the spillage of oil 
on the high seas. 
Social-linkage effects are international environmental problems 
in which no physical-linkages exist, but where, nonetheless, the 
policies of one national government infringe directly on the well-
being of citizens of one or more nations. A classic case of a non-
monetary social-linkage effect is one country's possession of unique 
natural resources that citizens of other nations value. The extinction 
of African wildlife may be a local phenomenon, but as citizens of 
other nations become concerned, the problem reaches international 
proportions. 
B. Problem Delimitation 
This paper is broadly concerned with pecuniary social-linkage 
effects in which environmental policies of one national government 
infringe on established economic relationships with other nations. 
Difficult transnational and global physical-linkage problems (or 
apparent problems) are not treated in any depth here. More specifi-
cally, this study explores possible major impacts, both favorable 
and adverse, of the United States' domestic environmental policies 
on the economic development of less developed countries (LDCs) as 
regards foreign trade, investment, and aid. 2 This paper is directed 
primarily at the U.S. situation, but what is described could be ap-
plied to the effect of the environmental policies of other developed 
countries on LDCs. 
This inquiry does not attempt to elaborate upon the effects of 
American environmental controls upon its own international trade 
position and national economy, but rather is concerned with the 
effects of domestic U.S. environmental policies on the economic 
development of LDCs. It should be noted, though, that remedial 
approaches to the latter concern are closely interwoven with those 
of the former. 
C. Problematic Situation 
Members of the official U.S. delegation to the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm from 
June 5-16, 1972, were made acutely aware of the growing division 
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between the rich and poor nations on the subject of environmental 
quality.3 They found that many LDCs fear that environmental poli-
cies in developed countries will adversely affect their trade posi-
tions, foreign investments, and international assistance. 
D. Objectives of Study 
It is the thesis of this paper that a serious dilemma will exist (or 
presently exists) between the LDCs and the U.S. concerning the 
impact of domestic U.S. environmental policies on the economic 
development of LDCs.4 It is assumed that both sides (at least ver-
bally) agree on the need for rapid social and economic development 
of the LDCs and that U.S. domestic environmental policies are the 
result of domestic objectives and decisions regarding acceptable 
national pollution levels. In the absence of global pollution, these 
domestic considerations are not easily subject to international 
agreement. (Clearly, global pollution must be considered interna-
tionally.) This paper explores diagnostic hypotheses aimed at im-
proving the U.S. environment and simultaneously aiding interna-
tional development strategy. Truly complementary solutions can-
not, of course, be achieved, but special care should be given to 
identifying all possible areas of agreement while at the same time 
minimizing any possible conflict. It would be a major setback if the 
solutions to U.S. environmental problems were to create fresh diffi-
culties for LDCs. 
II. EXISTING SITUATION 
A. U.S. Trade Policy and LDCs 
As most of their capital goods must be acquired abroad, LDCs 
depend on their ability to rapidly increase imports from the U.S. 
and other advanced countries for their continued economic progress. 
To obtain the foreign exchange to pay for imports, the LDCs rely 
on three principal sources: export earnings (about 75%), public 
loans and grants (about 15%), and private capital (about 10%).5 
In its plan for the Development Decade of the 1970's, the United 
Nations has proposed a target growth rate of gross national product 
(GNP) of 6% per annum for the LDCs. Worldwide endorsement of 
this target is based in part on the premise that successful economic 
development of LDCs is essential to their own social well-being and 
political stability. 
Although the U.S. buys 49% of her foreign purchases from LDCs,6 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the U.S. discriminate against the 
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imports of manufactured goods from LDCs.7 
The recent U.N. Conference on the Human Environment adopted 
the Declaration on the Human Environment, which is a statement 
of fundamental principles recommended by the international com-
munity. The action plan consists of 109 recommendations for spe-
cific steps that must be taken to turn the principles of the Declara-
tion into reality. Among the 109 recommendations made at the 
Conference were: 
(1) The world's wealthy nations would not invoke environmental mat-
ters as a pretext for discriminating trade policies. 
(2) GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and UNCTAD 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) would be al-
lowed to monitor and assess tariff and trade barriers resulting from 
environmental policies. 
(3) Financial and technical assistance would be provided to help poor 
countries remove such obstacles to their exports. 
(4) Appropriate measures for compensation would be provided where 
environmental standards have a negative effect on developing nations' 
exports. 
All these propositions were opposed by the United States which 
maintained that many factors affect export earnings and singling 
out any of these facts for compensatory treatment would be wrong 
in principle and would undermine environmental responsibility.s 
B. Possible Negative Impacts on LDCs 
1. Exports 
U.S. domestic environmental control regulations can adversely 
affect the trade of LDCs through their impact in areas such as 
import regulations and standards and health control regulations 
which can act as trade barriers. Registration and labelling regula-
tions are also becoming increasingly elaborate. For example, as the 
U.S. moves toward banning the domestic use of DDT, imports from 
LDCs, primarily imports of foods processed with certain chemicals, 
will be restricted.9 
Anti-pollution measures in the U.S. can create indirect import 
restrictions. The U.S. environmental measures limiting the use of 
lead in automobile fuel, for instance, may adversely affect the bal-
ance of payments of certain lead-producing LDCs such as Bolivia. 
Restrictions on sulphur content in fuels is leading to trade shifts 
within the LDCs in favor of Indonesian, North African, and Nige-
rian oil. In the past, Venezuelan oil, which is quite high in sulphur, 
has supplied about 40% of the residual demand in the U.S.IO 
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In the long run, another second-order impact facing LDCs' ex-
ports of primary products arises from the growing trend toward the 
recycling of raw materials in the U.S. Increased re-use of materials 
will impair the ability of LDCs to export primary products, which 
presently make up two-thirds of the total exports of LDCs. 
2. Imports 
U.S. expenditures on the environment will, in varying degrees, 
lead to price increases in various U.S. industries. As of yet, it is 
difficult to gauge the economic interaction of various expenditures, 
and most of the existing estimates relate to the effects of specific 
measures. On the average, it has been estimated that compliance 
with adopted and pending environmental standards will mean a 5-
10% rise in the costs of production and a 5-10% growth of capital 
expenditures in major industries. Such a rise in internal prices 
would lead to a rise in export prices of 4-9%.11 For specific industries, 
pollution control costs might be much larger. 
Such a rise in prices could become a tangible factor in interna-
tional trade competition. Enforcement of environmental policies by 
the U.S. might lead to serious increases in production costs and 
shifts in competitive power. Consequently, pressures to raise tariff 
barriers in specified areas may increase. Well-financed lobbies for 
particular industries are likely to have a loud voice. 
The scope and character of future trade shifts in specific commod-
ities will depend on the methods and policy instruments through 
which environmental actions are carried out. If the U.S. opts to 
subsidize industries hard hit by environmental costs, the major 
impact on the LDCs will be a general, though minimal, rise in 
import price. Where the government forces the industry to directly 
invest in pollution control, through taxes, effluent charges, or other 
penalties, LDCs' import prices will rise directly with cost to the 
industry.12 Of course, under the present IRS code, investment for 
pollution control facilities in an existing plant may be amortized 
over five years l3 which, in effect, gives the investor a government 
subsidy. 
3. Foreign Aid 
Among the LDCs it is feared that the costs of environmental 
improvement might become a competitor for the resources of the 
U.S. and thereby affect the amount of aid given to LDCs. The third 
annual report of the Council on Environmental Quality estimates 
that $287.1 billion (1971 dollars) will have to be invested in pollution 
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control and maintenance to meet present and new standards be-
tween 1971 and 1980. It has been estimated that total national an-
nualized costs will rise from $10.4 billion in 1970 to $33.3 billion in 
1980.14 These costs represent a measure of national resources which 
must be used to meet environmental goals and are therefore una-
vailable for other uses. 
Moreover, there is a growing feeling in LDCs that large-scale in-
vestments in the protection of the environment might retard eco-
nomic growth by diverting resources into "non-productive" activi-
ties, thus diminishing the total size of the GNP and narrowing the 
basis for foreign assistance. 
Further, there is concern that in providing aid, the U.S. will un-
fairly press its own domestic environmental standards on the LDCs. 
Related to this is the concern that the type of technology imported 
from the U.S. will not be well adapted to use in LDCs. For example, 
the U.S. may export engine types to LDCs in which considerable 
cost is incurred to keep emissions low for domestic U.S. purposes 
but lower than LDCs would find optimal. 
C. Possible Positive Impacts on LDCs 
1. Exports 
The U. S. preoccupation with the environment has tended to give 
a new dimension to the relationship between natural and synthetic 
products. Attention has been concentrated on two aspects of syn-
thetic products: the properties of the products themselves and the 
role of chemical industries as major polluters. 
Though many synthetic products have new and desirable quali-
ties which can give them a great competitive advantage, the growing 
preoccupation with the environment is disclosing many qualities 
(e.g. non-degradability) which are undesirable and which, in the 
future, may tend to diminish markets for them. (The Netherlands 
is currently sponsoring a plan to tax producers of synthetic substi-
tutes for primary products for environmental damage.)15 
Chemical industries are major polluters of both the air and water. 
Large scale investments in anti-pollution equipment and installa-
tions will raise the costs of many chemical products. This does not 
automatically mean that synthetics will be priced out of the market 
by natural products, but a re-examination might disclose fields 
where, instead of additional expenditures to achieve environmental 
quality in the production of chemical synthetics, investments could 
be devoted to promoting and bettering the production of natural 
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products. This would simultaneously protect the environment of the 
U.S. and aid international development strategy. 
A possible example is natural rubber versus synthetic rubber pro-
duction. 16 Whereas the rubber tree can flourish as part of a natural 
ecological system in the tropics using renewable solar energy, the 
synthetic rubber in the U.S. is made from nonrenewable petroleum 
or natural gas. 
2. Investments 
U.S. environmental actions could also have a major impact on the 
location of U.S. industries and on U.S. foreign investments. For 
some U.S. industries, the rising costs of environmental programs 
might lead to the transfer of the industry to countries, including 
LDCs, where environmental standards are not so strict. (Since con-
cern with the environment is growing in all countries, the scope of 
U.S. capital outflows is evidently limited.) 
Anti-pollution measures in the U.S. might also provide an incen-
tive for increased processing of raw materials in LDCs before export 
to the U.S. as the primary processing of raw materials is among the 
most polluting of industrial activities. 
One may question the categorization of U.S. "pollution exporta-
tion" as beneficial to LDCs. Comparative advantage requires that 
each country utilize its unique productive resources to their best 
advantage. The environment's capacity to assimilate and neutralize 
waste residuals could be considered as a productive resource. For 
the above possibilities to be strictly beneficial to LDCs, we would 
have to assume that LDCs have relatively large environmental as-
similative capacities which is a questionable assumption. 17 Thus, 
other things being equal, LDCs could produce commodities with 
relatively high waste loads per unit production for export. This com-
parative advantage assumes that citizens of LDCs do not have as 
great a preference for environmental quality as citizens in the higher 
developed countries which have strained the assimilative capacity 
of their environment to its limit. 
To some extent, a LDC might justify becoming a "pollution 
haven" by setting low environmental standards designed to attract 
industrial investment. Setting such standards would probably be 
fully within its prerogatives as a sovereign nation so long as its pol-
lution does not cross national frontiers or unduly contaminate global 
air and water resources. In the long run, it is doubtful that such a 
country's overall economic development would be helped because 
heavy social costs could slow down its development over the long 
116 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
run as Japan, for example, is discovering. Nevertheless, immediate 
political, social and economic pressures in many developing nations 
might force lower environmental standards. 
D. U.S. Balance of Payments and National Income Effects 
If the U.S. insists on strict anti-pollution measures either through 
direct regulation or the price system, the U.S. industries may find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage because of price in-
creases. This will be especially possible if it is assumed that other 
countries lag behind in environmental legislation or if it is thought 
that other countries will subsidize their environmental controls 
while the U.S. taxes industry for environmental disruption. Such a 
competitive disadvantage would hurt the U.S. trade balance and, 
unless it were offset by a monetary or fiscal policy, national income 
would decline. IS 
At the minimum, domestic U.S. pollution measures would require 
readjustments among industries to reflect the new cost structure. 
Additionally, such measures could encourage the outflow of invest-
ment funds, perhaps worsen our balance of payments, reduce do-
mestic growth and increase unemployment. Whether this will in 
fact become a serious problem depends on a number of complex 
issues. 
III. DESIRED SITUATION 
This paper does not question that the U.S. should internalize the 
external costs of domestic production for this is necessary if the U.S. 
is to have a socially efficient economy. The desired result is to mini-
mize the negative U.S. impacts on the economic development of 
LDCs and achieve the U.S. domestic goals of environmental qual-
ity, while simultaneously balancing other domestic objectives such 
as balance of payments, growth of GNP, limited inflation and full 
employment. 
A. Comparative Advantage 
On the basis of comparative advantage, it is important that U.S. 
domestic environmental protection does not become a rationaliza-
tion for greater protection of U.S. industries and agriculture. One 
of the most important world welfare propositions in international 
trade literature is that, given a world composed of sovereign states 
independent of each other through international market exchanges, 
world welfare will be maximized if domestic and international 
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prices fully reflect the social costs of production and consumption 
for all states. ID 
LDCs fear that cost increases for environmental controls in the 
U.S. will give rise to "neoprotectionism" to protect domestic indus-
tries from those in LDCs whose environmental standards are lower. 
Comparative advantage is central to the belief that tariffs are unde-
sirable. Tariffs and other trade barriers distort the relationship be-
tween prices and costs of production for individual countries and 
hence reduce global output. 
It is in the interest of the U.S. to allow LDCs to increase their 
exports since they will then be able to procure larger amounts of 
exports from the U.S. The gain from trade expansion should more 
than offset the cost involved in the displacement of labor and capi-
tal from certain industries placed at a comparative disadvantage. 
B. Declaration Principles 
The desired situation can best be stated by the eleventh of 
twenty-six principles which were unanimously adopted by the U.N. 
Conference in its Declaration on the Human Environment. The 
eighth, ninth and twelfth principles are relevant preambles to the 
ideal stated in the eleventh and hence they are included. The Decla-
ration's aim is "to guide the peoples of the world in the preservation 
and enhancement of the human environment." 
8. Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favora-
ble living and working environment for man and for creating conditions 
on earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life. 
9. Environmental deficiencies generated by the conditions of under-
development and natural disasters pose grave problems and can best be 
remedied by accelerated development through the transfer of substan-
tial quantities of financial and technological assistance as a supplement 
to the domestic effort of the developing countries and such timely assis-
tance as may be required. 
11. The environmental policies of all States should enhance and not 
adversely affect the present or future development potential of develop-
ing countries, nor should they hamper the attainment of better living 
conditions for all, and appropriate steps should be taken by States and 
international organizations with a view to reaching agreement on meet-
ing the possible national and international economic consequences re-
sulting from the application of environmental measures. 
12. Resources should be made available to preserve and improve the 
environment, taking into account the circumstances and particular re-
quirements of developing countries and any costs which may emanate 
from their incorporating environmental safeguards into their develop-
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ment planning and the need for making available to them, upon their 
request, additional international technical and financial assistance for 
this purpose. 20 
The concern with the international human environment, cli-
maxed by the recent U.N. Conference, has arisen at a time when 
the efforts of the LDCs are being increasingly devoted to develop-
ment. The compelling urgency of the development objective has 
been endorsed in the proposals set out by the U.N. for the Second 
Developmental Decade. Of the six major problem areas covered by 
the Conference on the Human Environment, the fifth was devoted 
to development and the environment. 
The dilemma developing in this paper between the LDCs and the 
U.S. concerning the impact of U.S. domestic environmental policies 
on LDC's economic development has, to a large extent, emerged out 
of the environmental response in the U.S. to high level economic 
development. The LDCs are not, of course, unconcerned with these 
problems. LDCs have an obvious vital stake in these problems to 
the extent of their impact on their own economic development. 
They also have an interest in them to the extent that these problems 
accompany the process of development and are already emerging as 
the developmental capacity of the LDCs increases. 
One of the major questions which arises from the developing fric-
tion between LDCs and more developed nations is how the poten-
tially higher cost of future development of LDCs would be shared 
between the U.S. and LDCs. There are misgivings in LDCs arising 
not only from their present low economic capacity but also from 
their declining relative share in world trade and the increasing gap 
in per capita income. Because of these factors, LDCs might not be 
able to take full advantage of the fresh opportunities that may arise 
from the possible positive impacts of environmental programs. At 
the same time, they may have to bear the extra burdens which 
domestic U.S. environmental controls may entail. 
IV. DIAGNOSTIC HYPOTHESES 
A. U.S. Impact on LDCs' Exports and Imports 
Export subsidies and import surcharges to compensate U.S. in-
dustries for the cost of pollution control, while superficially attrac-
tive, have major disadvantages. They could serve as an invitation 
for other countries to control imports and expand exports, contrary 
to GATT obligations. This scheme also does not provide an incen-
tive for minimizing pollution control costs and, consequently, does 
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not necessarily lead to lower pollution levels. 
In contrast to the above arguments, the U.S. may still find it 
desirable to tax some imported products. For example, if the U.S. 
finds it desirable to tax leaded gasoline and to incorporate that cost 
into the price, it is altogether appropriate to assess a corresponding 
tax on the importation of like products. The essential difference is 
that products which pollute in use are a cost to the country in which 
they are consumed; products which pollute while they are being 
produced are a cost to the country in which they are produced. 
For the U.S., it may be tempting to use environmental control 
and pollution abatement measures as subtle trade barriers. In many 
cases, it will be difficult to determine if such trade barriers are being 
used to legitimately protect domestic health and safety or are indi-
rect means of achieving protection for U.S. domestic firms con-
fronted with rising environmental costs and a loss in comparative 
international advantage. 
If trade barriers are enforced to prevent legitimate health hazards 
and an international agreement is reached on acceptable standards, 
the trade barriers should not be interpreted as being discriminatory 
against the exports of LDCs. However, actions might be taken to 
cushion the disruptive effects on the trade of LDCs through a sys-
tem of prior consultation on contemplated actions. Additional aid 
might be channeled toward adapting the export industries in LDCs 
to the new environmental requirements of the U.S. or, alternatively, 
toward a diversification of their exports. 
A GATT type of organization might be used to analyze and arbi-
trate trade barriers so that U.S. environmental controls do not be-
come the instrument of selective non tariff barriers. At present, 
GATT inadequately covers non tariff distortions. 
Present GATT procedures, which rely on notifications of member 
countries of nontariff barriers affecting their exports, place the 
LDCs at a fundamental disadvantage. In addition to LDCs' inher-
ently weak bargaining position, the fact that many LDCs are not 
contracting parties to the General Agreement makes nontariff bar-
riers an area of special concern to the LDCs. Clearly the position of 
the LDCs does not receive adequate emphasis in the present inter-
national forum. 
Increased U.S. recycling of raw materials may restrict the growth 
of primary export markets, but this should not lead to serious mar-
ket distortions in the short run. However, in cases of profound tech-
nological breakthroughs, short-run market disruptions might follow. 
In these instances, it may be necessary for the U.S. to safeguard the 
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interests of primary-producing LDCs through a system of prior 
warnings and consultation and also through compensatory financ-
ing. In the long run, the impact on LDCs' export earnings from 
increased U.S. recycling of raw materials are difficult to predict 
since large-scale recycling may only occur in a situation of extreme 
supply shortage. 
B. Impact on LDCs' Foreign Aid 
1. U.S. Burden 
In absolute terms, the U.S. pollution abatement costs outlined on 
page 110 seem large. However, total environmental costs during the 
1971-1980 period are estimated to represent only 2.2% of the total 
GNP during this same period. 21 Presently, the U.S. gives a token 
pledge of about 1% of her GNP as aid to LDCs.22 Put in the proper 
perspective, U.S. environmental problems may be little more than 
a question of re-examination of national priorities and commitment 
to the economic development of LDCs. 
Whether budgets are relatively fixed and whether the U.S. will 
actually view domestic environmental control as a higher priority 
use of funds cannot be foreseen. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that a substantial proportion of total costs for environ-
mental pollution reductions will not be borne by the U.S. govern-
ment. If the "polluter must pay" principle is adopted extensively, 
government subsidies for pollution control will be approximately 
50% of total pollution costS. 23 This cost should not be allowed to 
have a pronounced negative impact on present levels of foreign aid 
funds to LDCs. 
2. Technology Transfer 
The American preoccupation with non-pollutive technology may 
result in a transfer of technology to LDCs that is inappropriate in 
those foreign environments. If such equipment is significantly more 
expensive than the present technology, its export to LDCs under 
tied credit will reduce the real content of foreign assistance. Moreo-
ver, the export of U.S. pollution equipment designed to conform to 
U.S. needs may force LDCs to adopt, de facto, inappropriate and 
inefficient environmental standards. 
C. U.S. Environmental Policies' Impact on the U.S. 
Preliminary research conducted by Professor Ralph d' Arge at the 
University of California indicates that, under certain assumptions, 
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the effect on the U.S. national income of unilaterally imposing do-
mestic pollution abatement measures is likely to be sma1l24 and 
might even lead to an improvement in the U.S. balance of pay-
ments. It is important to note that even though GNP as convention-
ally measured may fall, the U.S. welfare will be increased, assuming 
the U.S. reduces its pollution to the optimal level, when its marginal 
costs of doing so equal the marginal benefits. If the U.S. attaches a 
higher priority to anti-pollution expenditures, this amounts to say-
ing that they do not have a comparative advantage in producing 
pollution intensive goods. It is appropriate that international trade 
patterns reflect this in higher prices for those particular goods. 
This is not to say that impacts on particular industries might not 
be substantial, as indeed they probably will be. However, these are 
likely to be marginally profitable operations which are unable to 
meet the social costs of production even aside from international 
trade considerations. International relocation of U.S. industries 
may harm certain sectors of the U.S. economy, but it is desirable 
from a global efficiency standpoint. Relocations should be looked 
upon as short-run disruptions providing an opportunity for domestic 
U.S. production to be shifted to more internationally productive 
uses. 
Although the assumptions underlying the above research are 
quite restrictive, they provide evidence that the U.S. should not 
limit its pollution abatement activities merely because of adverse 
impacts on its foreign economic position. U.S. technological ad-
vances in pollution abatement equipment and techniques may be 
transformed into very substantial export items in its balance of 
payments. This initial technological lead and a growing foreign con-
cern with pollution offer means for offsetting any other unfavorable 
balance of payments effects.25 
V. REMEDIAL HYPOTHESES 
A. Future Research 
The mounting concern for environmental resources in the U.S. is 
of relatively recent origin. The calculation of economic costs and 
benefits, the methods of governmental control, and the economic 
implications of these measures have not been systematically and 
exhaustively examined. Accordingly, there is a great opportunity for 
identifying specific problems before they become acute and suggest-
ing policies that will minimize international tensions. 
The impact of U.S. domestic environmental policies on LDCs 
depends upon a complex mix of factors. The particular method of 
• 
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financing domestic pollution control (e.g. government subsidies, 
direct regulation, incorporation of costs in price), the commodity 
structure of U.S. export and import sectors, the responsiveness of 
the supply and demand of the different commodities to price 
changes, pollution control measures taken by other countries, and 
the relative assimilative capacities of the U.S. and the other coun-
tries' environments are some possible variables that need further 
investigation to determine numerical values of the trade and invest-
ment consequences on LDCs. Research also needs to be done on the 
general proposition that world trade sayres world resources. That is, 
is the U.S. producing a number of industrial goods and agricultural 
commodities at a considerably higher cost (including ecological) 
than LDCs? 
B. Consequences of Inaction 
There is an urgent need for the U.S. to identify the possible im-
pacts of its domestic environmental policies on LDCs before they 
become a serious source of international friction. Environmental 
problems are growing at an increasing rate, and the emergence of a 
world structure of authority which could allow for their solution has 
been correspondingly slow. The effective role of international envi-
ronmental cooperation is presently confined to information gather-
ing and monitoring. 
The gap between the rich and the poor nations is rapidly widen-
ing. From 1967 to 1969, the per capita income in the U.S. rose from 
$3,270 to $3,800: an increase of $530. Even discounting inflation, 
this increase was about twice that of the entire per capita income 
in Guatemala, which stagnated at around $250. When one considers 
the grossly uneven distribution of national income in Guatemala, 
that disparity is even more horrendous. (The increase in the U.S. 
GNP between 1970 and 1971 was greater than the total 1970 GNP 
of all of Africa!26) What do Guatemalan peasants have to do with 
pollution in the U.S.? If we sanction the growing income disparity, 
the answer is nothing - that is, until a revolution brews and world 
peace is threatened. The U.S. must accept the challenge of environ-
mental quality but simultaneously work toward global justice.27 
C. Additional Costs 
It is not surprising that the American public may be presently 
unconcerned with the impacts of U.S. domestic environmental poli-
cies on LDCs when the annual report of the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality does not include in their numerical estimates of domes-
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tic pollution control expenses any added costs for first and second 
order negative impacts on the economic development of LDCs. The 
added costs may have to cover considerably more than the costs of 
research and may indeed involve the incorporation of a new compo-
nent into the costs of our domestic environmental programs in the 
form of compensation for extra costs or competitive disadvantages 
injected into the developmental programs of LDCs. 
The U.S. delegates to the U.N. Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment in their official report to the U.S. Senate recommended 
that any costs resulting from the four recommendations listed on 
page 112 of this paper should be associated with general aid to 
LDCs and not to specific U.S. environmental standards. 2R It is im-
portant to note that this policy may all too easily obscure the fact 
that these extra costs must be met through supplementary funds on 
favorable terms, funds that are additional to the overall flow of 
developmental assistance. U.S. domestic environmental problems 
and their effect of the U.S. economy should not provide the U.S. 
with a new excuse to neglect the needs of LDCs.29 
CONCLUSION 
Included in the 8,000 documents introduced at the Stockholm 
Conference is an obscure but vitally important report from the 
United Nations Committee for Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD) .30 This document concerns the effects of planetary good 
housekeeping on the trade and development of LDCs. In spite of the 
350 basic documents produced by the Conference, very little in the 
form of positive results will be produced unless actions are taken by 
the more developed countries. 
In 1970, eighteen industrialized countries (including the U.S.) 
agreed in principle to extend for a ten year period a zero tariff on 
imports of manufactured goods and a few primary commodities 
from LDCs. (Textiles, shoes, and petroleum products are excluded 
from the proposal for the U.S.) According to an estimate by the U.S. 
State Department, U.S. participation would increase LDCs' exports 
by an estimated $400 million per year over levels that would other-
wise be reached. 
This agreement is already being implemented by the European 
Community and Japan. For the U.S., the matter has dragged on 
without implementation.31 
The U.S. vote against the four U.N. recommendations is consis-
tent with its inaction on trade preferences for LDCs. "The U.S. 
voted against these proposals because as a matter of principle it 
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opposes compensating countries for declines in their export earnings 
for whatever cause and believes that a commitment to pay such a 
compensation would serve as a disincentive to environmental con-
trois. "32 
When costs were involved, the U.S. at the Stockholm Conference 
failed to relate its concern for environmental objectives to the per-
haps more pressing need for international economic development. 3:1 
The U.S. delegation's vote against the four recommendations ap-
proved by the Conference on the Human Environment revealed a 
conflict between policy and action. Present concern with the possi-
ble impacts of domestic U.S. environmental programs on the eco-
nomic development of LDCs has not moved beyond a vague rheto-
nco 
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